## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreword</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talis Bachmann</td>
<td><em>Imagination as virtual reality and how it can be explained by the perceptual retouch theory of non-specific modulation</em></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariano L. Bianca and Lucia Foglia</td>
<td><em>Non-Perceptive Mental Image Generation: a Non-Linear Dynamic Framework</em></td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anna M. Borghi and Claudia Scorolli</td>
<td><em>Object Concepts and Mental Images</em></td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francesco Ferretti</td>
<td><em>Imagery, Perception and Creativity</em></td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Genone</td>
<td><em>Concepts and Imagery in Episodic Memory</em></td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janet Levin</td>
<td><em>Can Mental Images Provide Evidence for What is Possible?</em></td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marco Mazzone</td>
<td><em>Imagery, Language and the Flexibility of Thought</em></td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael J. Proulx and Petra Stoerig</td>
<td><em>Seeing sounds and tingling tongues: Qualia in synaesthesia and sensory substitution</em></td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frédérique de Vignemont</td>
<td><em>Brainreading of perceptual experiences: a challenge for first-person authority?</em></td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abstract
The relationship between perceptual experience and memory can seem to pose a challenge for conceptualism, the thesis that perceptual experiences require the actualization of conceptual capacities. Since subjects can recall features of past experiences for which they lacked corresponding concepts at the time of the original experience, it would seem that a subject’s conceptual capacities do not impose a limit on what he or she can experience perceptually. But this conclusion ignores the fact that concepts can be composed of other simpler concepts that a subject possessed earlier, and that demonstrative capacities can explain how a subject can experience a particular feature of her environment, even when she lacks a fully general concept for that feature. Using these resources, conceptualism can explain the relation between perceptual experience and memory. Nevertheless, a puzzle remains for the defender of conceptualism. A certain view about the relation between perceptual experience and mental imagery in episodic memory – that imagery in recall matches the experience retained in it – can make it difficult to understand how conceptualism could be true. For if a subject’s conceptual capacities determine what the phenomenology of an experience (or memory of it) is like, then one would expect a perceptual experience and its recall in memory to differ in phenomenology if they involve different concepts. In this essay, I solve this puzzle for conceptualism by undermining the assumption that there is a match between imagery in episodic memory and the phenomenal character of experience.

Keywords
Concepts, experience, imagery, memory, perception, phenomenology.

1. Concepts, Memory and Imagery

Conceptualism about perceptual experience is the view that what can be experienced perceptually is constrained by a subject’s conceptual capacities. While a variety of formulations of this view exist, the key claim for the view is that a subject cannot experience her environment as containing a particular object or property unless she possesses an associated concept under which the object or property falls, and which is actualized in her having the experience. While arguments both for and against conceptualism have received a great deal of attention in recent literature on perceptual experience, few have paid attention to how the relation between perceptual experience and memory bears on the debate about the role of concepts in experience. An important exception is Michael Martin, who in ‘Perception, Concepts, and Memory’ (Martin 1992) argues that reflecting on how newly learned concepts can be applied to perceptual experiences that have been preserved in memory shows that conceptualism is false. I have elsewhere argued that a conceptualist can acknowledge Martin’s account of the links between perceptual experience and memory without accepting his conclusion (Genone ms.). There I claim that by appealing to the fact that some concepts are composed of simpler ones that the subject possessed at an earlier time, and that others have their basis in more primitive demonstrative abilities, a conceptualist
view can be sustained in the face of Martin’s challenge.

After reviewing these issues in order to introduce a conceptualist account of the relation between perceptual experience and memory, I consider a separate but related problem facing conceptualism. Some philosophers have held that in order for a memory to involve experiential recall of a past perceptual experience the imagery accompanying the memory must match the remembered experience (Locke 1690/1975, Russell 1921). But given that the concepts involved in having a particular experience in part determine the phenomenology of the experience, a conceptualist view can seem to undermine the possibility of a match. For if different concepts are involved in the initial experience and its later recall, this would seem to suggest that the two states will differ in phenomenology. If the matching view is correct, then conceptualism would seem to be falsified.

The nature of imagery in memory is a topic that has also been explored by Martin (Martin 2001). In solving the puzzle of how a conceptualist can account for differences in phenomenology between a perceptual experience and the imagery involved in its being recalled, I will explore Martin’s views about memory imagery, as well as those of John Campbell put forward in his book Reference and Consciousness (Campbell 2002). Drawing on their insights, I will suggest that by rejecting the view that there must be a match in phenomenology between a perceptual experience and its recall, conceptualism can give the correct account of the connection between perception and memory.

2. Memory and Conceptualism

What precisely does it mean to claim that perceptual experiences are conceptual? Many theorists have supposed that what matters here is what sort of content we attribute to perceptual experiences. Some philosophers have claimed that perceptual experiences are propositional attitudes, and hence have propositional contents (Brewer 1999, McDowell 1994, Searle 1983). Since propositions are thought by these philosophers to have concepts as their constituents, such contents will be by definition conceptual. The question of whether or not perceptual experiences are propositional attitudes, or even representational at all, however, is not one that needs to be taken for granted in formulating conceptualism. We can instead say that a perceptual experience is conceptual if and only if having that experience requires the possession and actualization of the same conceptual capacities required for having an associated belief. So if perceptual experiences are conceptual, then perceiving a cup on a table will require a subject to possess and actualize the same conceptual capacities required for having a belief about a cup on a table.

If this is right, then we can ask whether we have reason to think perceptual experiences are conceptual. If we can find evidence that one can have a perceptual experience of a particular object or property (under a certain aspect or description) while lacking the conceptual resources to have a belief about that object or property (under the same aspect or description), then we will have reason to reject the view that perceptual experiences are conceptual. According to Mar-
tin (1992), reflecting on the relationship between perceptual experience and memory provides us with such evidence. Martin claims that it is possible to have experiences of objects or properties even though one lacks an associated concept. To see this, we can imagine a case in which a subject experiences an object or property without noticing it. If we suppose that the subject in the meantime gains a concept that she lacked at the time of the original experience, and employs it in recalling the experience, then this would suggest that she did not need to possess the concept to have had an experience of the object or property in the first place. For example, when I was young, I didn’t pay much attention to people’s appearances, and although I lacked the concept of a dimple, it is highly likely that I had many experiences of people with dimpled cheeks. It is not hard to imagine that in recalling the appearance of someone from my childhood, I remember the person as having dimpled cheeks, a concept I have since learned. This would seem to suggest that my experience was not limited by the concepts I possessed at the time. Although I lacked the concept of a dimple, this person must have appeared to me as having dimples if I am later able to remember him or her that way. If this example and others like it are legitimate, they would seem to constitute counterexamples to the thesis of conceptualism.

One strategy for combating this challenge would be to deny the legitimacy of the phenomenon Martin calls attention to. One might think that if a subject did not initially notice the object or property that is supposedly later recalled, then it was not really experienced at all. We could then explain the purported memory as a case of false memory – we might think in the above example that I seem to remember people from my past as having dimples only because I now know them to have them. I think this is the wrong strategy for the conceptualist. First of all, while one might try to undermine purported counterexamples on a case by case basis, Martin only needs to convincingly describe one instance of the phenomenon in order to advance his argument against conceptualism. Moreover, it is often the case that one can legitimately recall having seen or heard something that one failed to notice at the time of the experience. For example, while searching the living room for my keys I might realize that I just saw them in the bedroom without in my haste having noticed them. There is no prima facie reason to suppose that a case like this could not involve a subject having gained a concept that she could employ in recalling the experience at a later time.

The correct strategy for responding to the phenomenon that Martin draws our attention to is to grant its possibility, but argue nevertheless that it does not threaten conceptualism. In order to do this, it is necessary to affirm that the subject did not experience anything for which she lacked conceptual resources. There are two kinds of cases here. To return to the above example, a conceptualist could argue that if the person’s dimples really were part of my experience, then I must have conceptualized them on the basis of geometric concepts I had available to me at the time. Assuming for the sake of argument that the concept of a dimple has the concept of an indentation as one of its components, then we can see how the feature later conceptualized in memory with the concept of a
dimple could have been part of my earlier experience. Supposing I have since gained the more complex concept, we can imagine that by recognizing its constituent in the earlier experience when I recall it, I can apply the concept of dimpled cheeks to the person I remember.\(^3\)

A second sort of case concerns a memory involving a non-composite concept that was lacked by the subject at the time of the original experience. Color concepts provide a convenient example. If we suppose that I lacked the concept of hazel when I was young, and we suppose that we cannot understand the concept of hazel simply as a composite of brown and green, then it will not be possible to explain my remembering people from my youth as having hazel eyes in terms of simpler concepts I possessed at the time. Another strategy is available to the conceptualist, however, and that is to claim that I possessed a demonstrative capacity to attend to hazel colored objects, which I could have employed by thinking of them or referring to them as being \textit{that} shade. If I had not possessed such a capacity, the conceptualist can insist, then it is not correct to say that I could have had an experience of the property in the first place.\(^4\)

So according to the line of defense suggested here, a conceptualist can maintain that subjects can recall experiences on the basis of concepts they initially lacked, but only if other appropriate conceptual capacities were available to them. There are, of course, further considerations on behalf of both the conceptualist and the nonconceptualist that can be raised in this context. I have examined these issues in detail elsewhere (Genone ms.). Assuming for now that this version of conceptualism can withstand Martin’s challenge, I want to consider how it leads to a related difficulty concerning the relation between perceptual experience and memory – one that a conceptualist needs to be able to explain in order for the view to be sustained.

3. Concepts and Phenomenal Character

According to the defense of conceptualism I suggested in the previous section, a conceptualist should maintain that a subject can employ different concepts in recalling a perceptual experience than were employed at the original time of the experience. While this might make sense of the challenge presented by Martin, it leads to further difficulties for conceptualism. To see what these difficulties are, it is first necessary to explore the relation between concepts and the phenomenology of perceptual experience and memory. A natural assumption for a conceptualist view about experience is that there is a close connection between the concepts that are involved in a subject having a particular experience and what that experience is like for her.\(^5\) It is because a subject has the concept of an automobile that she can see that the large mass of metal and plastic before her is an automobile, rather than just a mass of metal and plastic. Likewise, it is because her experience presents her with a particular mass of metal and plastic that the concept of an automobile is relevant to her experience. According to the view presented in the previous section, a perceptual experience and its recall in memory can involve different concepts if the subject has in the interim gained a new
concept. Although I argued that there must be a connection between the concepts applied to an experience that is recalled in memory and the concepts involved in the original experience, it nevertheless follows that the fact that a new concept is applied to the experience in memory will involve a phenomenal difference between the experience and its recall.

To see this, we can, returning to the above example, suppose that on first being confronted with a person who has dimpled cheeks, I can experience the dimples on the basis of my concept of an indentation. Later, having gained the concept of dimples, I recall the person as having dimpled cheeks. It is natural to think that there is a phenomenal difference between these two experiences, for if they were exactly the same, there would be no reason to suppose that the concept of dimples would be involved in my memory of the person. The difference consists in whatever else is involved in seeing someone as having dimples rather than just seeing the person as having indentations in his or her cheeks. Although the concept of an indentation is a component of the concept of a dimple, the two cannot be equivalent, otherwise there would be no reason to suppose that I didn’t have the concept of a dimple in the first place. What this difference amounts to, phenomenologically speaking, is at the very least a difference in the salience or relevance of various aspects of what one experiences. For example, a person with dimples might look jolly to me, but someone who I see as having indented cheeks would probably not look that way.

It might be objected that what is really going on is that there is a common experiential element present in both the perceptual experience and the memory of it, but that this common element has a different significance for me given the change in my conceptual resources. This would ignore, however, the ways in which a dimple looks different than a mere indentation. To suppose that there is no visual difference between the two would undermine the basis for the application of a different concept in each case. So the conceptualist is committed to the idea that insofar as different concepts are involved in a perceptual experience and its recall, the memory and the experience will differ phenomenologically.

To see how this creates a problem for conceptualism, it is necessary to make some distinctions with respect to the kinds of memories that might be relevant here. Among species of conscious memory, philosophers and psychologists have distinguished between procedural, factual, and episodic memory (Sutton 2004). Procedural memory – remembering how to do something – is not relevant for present purposes. Factual memory, sometimes called semantic or propositional memory, involves remembering that something happened. Episodic memory, sometimes called personal memory, involves remembering a particular past episode that one experienced. One can have a factual memory without having experienced what is thereby remembered. For example, I can remember that yesterday was my sister’s birthday, without having had a perceptual experience of her birthday that I am remembering. On the other hand, episodic memory does require that I experienced what I now remember. I cannot remember the way my sister looked on her birthday if I did not see her on that day.
From the point of view of thinking about links between concepts and the phenomenology of memory, we can note that both factual and episodic memory can involve imagery, and that as suggested above, it seems natural to suppose there is a tight link between the imagery and a subject’s conceptual capacities. For example, it would not seem to make sense to suppose that a subject could remember that aardvarks have teeth while imagining what one looked like with its mouth open if she lacked the associated concepts. Likewise, it seems highly plausible that the imagery involved in remembering seeing an automobile will differ depending on whether or not one possesses the concept of an automobile – for if one lacks the concept, then one will just remember it as, say, a large mass of metal and plastic. As suggested above, we should think of this as a phenomenological difference in order to make sense of why the subject would apply a different concept in the two cases.

In the present context, what needs to be examined is whether or not conceptualism, at least as I have proposed it should be developed, creates a problem for the relationship between the phenomenology of perceptual experience and that of memory by claiming that a perceptual experience and its later recall can involve different concepts. Some philosophers have held that there is a constitutive link between memory and perceptual experience that is preserved by imagery (Locke 1690/1975, Russell 1921). On this view, part of what constitutes a particular memory as being an episodic one is that it matches the experience it recalls. I will call this view “the matching view”. It is easy to see that the matching view poses no problem for factual memory. Although factual memory can involve imagery, as for example when I imagine my sister while remembering that her birthday was yesterday, there is no link between any particular perceptual experience I may have had and my memory, so there is no reason to think that the imagery involved in the memory should be true to any particular experience of my sister. According to the matching view, however, the same is not the case for episodic memory. If I remember what my sister looked like when she blew out the candles on her birthday, my experience of seeing her would seem to be constitutive of my memory being a memory of that particular episode as opposed to some other one.

To see why this is a problem for conceptualism, imagine that I see my sister on her birthday with her hair done up in a certain style, one that I have never encountered before. Later, being bored at the hair salon while waiting for my wife, I might study the pages of a hairstyle magazine and gain lots of new concepts for hairstyles. Then upon being queried by my sister as to whether I noticed her hairstyle on her birthday, we can imagine that I recall what she looked like and remember her as having done her hair in a twisted bun, the concept of which I acquired through my reading at the hair salon. The question for the conceptualist is whether my gaining and actualizing this new concept influences the imagery involved in my memory of seeing my sister’s hairstyle. Given what has been said above about the relation between concepts and imagery, it would seem that we must conclude that it does. Although my original experience, according to con-
ceptualism, will have involved various geometric and spatial concepts, perhaps some of which were demonstrative, these won’t be equivalent to the concept of a twisted bun, the concept I have since acquired. Hence, it follows that what it was like for me to see her hair on her birthday, and what it is like for me to recall how it looked are phenomenologically different. If this is correct, however, it violates the relationship the matching view maintains as holding between a perceptual experience and the imagery involved in episodic memory. If the imagery doesn’t match the original experience, then the constitutive link that, according to the matching view, makes the memory a memory of a particular episode seems to have been broken. How can conceptualism deal with this difficulty?

4. Imagery and Episodic Memory

We have seen that the matching view, if it were correct, would pose a significant problem for conceptualism. In order for conceptualism to maintain its coherence, it is necessary to find a way of responding to this challenge. What this requires is explaining how an episodic memory can be a memory of a particular past experience without assuming there to be matching phenomenology. Although the matching view can seem plausible, it has not gone unquestioned in contemporary philosophy. In ‘Out of the Past: Episodic Recall as Retained Acquaintance’, Mike Martin aims to undermine precisely this view (Martin 2001). According to Martin, the view that a perceptual experience and its recall in episodic memory must be phenomenologically alike poses a significant challenge for the idea that episodic memory involves recall of a past experience. This is because part of what it is to remember something one has previously experienced is to relate to it as something that happened in the past. If the memory and the recalled experience are phenomenally alike, however, it is difficult to see what the pastness of the memory will consist in. After all, recalling a past experience is not the same as experiencing something that happened in the past again (as seems to happen when we experience déjá vu). As Martin writes, “If episodic memory is to be the experience of the past … we need to have the experience of past events as being past” (Martin 2001: 268).

An obvious response to this difficulty might seem to be just to reject any connection between memory imagery and the phenomenology of the experience recalled. If this connection is broken, however, what seems to distinguish episodic memory from factual memory, namely that it is partly constituted by the experience it is a memory of, seems to be lost. Martin formulates this problem as a dilemma:

We seem to be faced with a choice: either we insist on the idea of episodic memory as retained apprehension or experience, in which case we can have no distinctive experience of the past as past; or we insist on the idea that the episodic memory has a distinctive phenomenology associated with the past, but thereby give up the idea that this has anything to do with retaining something from earlier experience (Martin, 2001: 269).
According to Martin, the solution to this problem is to realize that the connection between episodic memory and the remembered experience is representational rather than phenomenological. According to this line of thought, while a perceptual experience and an episodic memory of it will have the same object (i.e., they will both be of the same thing), they relate a subject to the object in different ways:

The idea here is that although perceptual experience and imagery may coincide with respect to the objects of experience, the events or qualities which are present to the mind, they will still differ in the manner by which these objects are given or presented to the mind. In general, perceptual experience allows for the presentation of objects and qualities, where imagery allows only for the re-presentation of such things (Martin, 2001: 271).

Just as the imagery involved in imagination in general involves representing the way something might be experienced, the imagery in episodic memory is here taken to be constituted by representing a past experience. For example, recalling the way my sister looked while blowing out the candles on her birthday involves representing that experience to myself. Doing this in no way requires that the imagery that constitutes my memory match the phenomenology of the original experience. The moral of these considerations, according to Martin, is that “imagination and memory relate to perception not through replicating the sensational or imagistic component of perception, but through being a form of representing such experiential encounter with the world” (Martin 2001: 273-74).

Although Martin’s suggestion allows us to reject the view that the imagery involved in episodic memory and the phenomenology of the experience recalled must match, the connection is not severed entirely. By posing a representational, or intentional connection between what was experienced and its later recall, Martin allows us to see how an episodic memory can still be tied to a particular perceptual episode. This can account both for the pastness of a memory as opposed to the original experience, and for the discrepancy that we would expect in phenomenology given the conceptualist account of differences in conceptual capacities that can be exercised in a perceptual experience and its recall in episodic memory.

John Campbell offers further support for the idea that the phenomenology of perceptual experience and the imagery involved in memory need not be alike (Campbell 2002). In characterizing how demonstrative reference is possible via memory, Campbell points out that matching phenomenology is neither necessary nor sufficient for connecting an experience with its recall. Against sufficiency, he describes a situation in which someone tries to jog someone else’s memory by describing an object from her childhood. In having the object described to her, the subject may come to visualize the object in a way that perfectly matches an experience she had of it in the past. Until she actually recognizes what she is imagining as the object of her past experience (Campbell describes this as the “Aha” moment), her imagining will not count as a case of memory.
Campbell also argues that it cannot be essential that the imagery that figures in memory match a particular past experience. If it were, it would be impossible for a subject to use the same demonstrative expression to refer to an object remembered on the basis of several previous experiences. Instead, Campbell suggests that all that is required is that past experience provides the subject with a referent for her use of the demonstrative. What enables a subject to use a demonstrative expression to refer to something she experienced in the past is what Campbell calls “deep decentering” – imagining oneself in the position of the past experience, and then treating it as if it were the present: “To understand the memory demonstrative is to simulate the time at which a past perceptual demonstrative could have been used” (Campbell 2002: 187). This is akin to Martin’s suggestion that the relation between an episodic memory and the experience it recalls is a representational one. Considering a case in which a demonstrative expression is used in memory to refer to an object experienced on different occasions, Campbell writes:

[…] your grasp of the memory demonstrative will depend on its being true that there is just one object from which your current memory derives. And that in general will not be something that can be guaranteed by the contents of your memory images or perceptual images alone – they could be exactly the same whether they derived from one object, a number of objects or no objects at all (Campbell, 2002: 191).

The upshot of these considerations, along with those offered by Martin, is that we have reason to reject the view that imagery in memory must match the phenomenology of the recalled experience. Reflecting both on the need to account for the pastness of memory, as well as our ability to refer demonstratively to remembered objects provides evidence that the relation between the imagery in memory and the recalled object of experience is an intentional one. With these lessons in mind, we can return to the conceptualist view offered above to see how it avoids the difficulties that seemed to face it in accommodating the relationship between perceptual experience and memory.

5. Conceptualism and Memory

The version of conceptualism defended here claims that a subject’s perceptual experience and its recall in memory have the phenomenology they do thanks in part to the conceptual capacities the subject possesses. This connection implies that if a perceptual experience and its recall involve the actualization of different conceptual capacities, the memory will differ phenomenologically from the original experience. While this initially seems to threaten the constitutive connection between an episodic memory and the experience it is a memory of, our examination of the views of Campbell and Martin gives us reason to doubt that matching phenomenology could have secured this connection in the first place. As they point out, a match between memory imagery and experience is not only inessential to the relation between perception and memory, but supposing that
there is such a match actually generates puzzles about the possibility of demonstrative reference via memory and about the pastness of memory.

By rejecting the matching view of the relation between the phenomenology of perceptual experience and memory, conceptualism can maintain that it is possible to remember an experience on the basis of concepts one lacked at the time of the original experience, provided that the newly gained concepts are appropriately linked to concepts that were originally available to the subject. By requiring this link between the concepts involved in a perceptual experience and a memory of it, conceptualism preserves the idea, suggested by Campbell and Martin, that there must be an intentional relation between perception and episodic memory. Since, according to conceptualism, the involvement of a newly learned concept in memory is grounded in the involvement of a more primitive but nevertheless related conceptual capacity in the original experience, a conceptualist view can insure that the memory is of the same feature of the world that was initially experienced by the subject. In light of the defense of conceptualism provided here, we see that respecting the relationship between perceptual experience and memory presents no difficulties that a conceptualist view cannot overcome.14

Endnotes

1 For purposes of this paper, I treat the term “imagery” as a way of talking about the experiential, or phenomenological, element involved in non-perceptual experiences.

2 These formulations are deliberately vague. I have done this so as to accommodate the wide variety of views that exist on the nature of perceptual experiences and intentional mental states in general. Adopting one or another of these views is inessential to the present line of inquiry, and the claims throughout this paper can be reformulated in terms of whatever view about the nature of intentionality one prefers. For example, if one is skeptical of propositions and thinks that mental states have some other kind of representational contents, then a mental state will be conceptual when being in a state with a certain content will require possessing and actualizing the concepts required for having a belief with the same content. The possibility of framing the debate about the role of concepts in perceptual experience in terms of conceptual states rather than contents was first pointed out by Heck (2000), and has since been further explored by Byrne (2004), andSpeaks (2005), who both suggest that the primary interest of the debate concerns issues which can be separated from disagreements over the nature of intentionality.

3 To respond in this way is not to allow that there is some common experiential element between the experience and the memory of it that is conceptualized in two different ways on separate occasions. Rather, the conceptualist claims that the concepts applied in the original experience make it possible both for the su-
bect to have the experience, and for related concepts to be applied in remember-
ing it. I am grateful to John Campbell for pressing me to clarify this point.

4 This way of envisioning the relationship between demonstrative capacities and
conscious attention is not uncontroversial. I say a bit more about this elsewhere
(Genone ms.). For an alternative account of the relation between demonstrative
capacities and attention, see Campbell (2002).

5 This assumption in no way entails a commitment to the view held by Dretske,
Harman, and Tye that the qualitative aspects of an experience can be reduced to

6 Locutions such as “I remember John” or “I remember London” might seem to
present a fourth kind of conscious memory – memory of a person or place. On
reflection, however, it would seem that examples like this are shorthand for ei-
ther factual or episodic memories, which might be glossed, for example as mea-
ning that the subject remembers that there is someone she knows named “John”
or remembers the experience of meeting him.

7 Although it is no problem if I have had one – it will just be causally rather than
constitutively relevant to my factual memory of her birthday.

8 This view has its origin in the empiricist “theory of ideas” which supposes me-
mories to be copies of perceptual impressions. Russell’s view, which rejects the
suggestion that the objects of memory are ideas, nevertheless assumes that the
matching of a memory image to an original experience plays a key role in e-
xplaining how the memory can be of a particular experience.

9 Arguably, we should suppose that the imagery must match some experience I
have had of my sister, or perhaps a range of such experiences. If not, it might be
unclear whether I have succeeded in remembering my sister or am instead re-
membering some other person. I will not pursue this issue further here.

10 Psychologists have challenged it as well. See, for example, Nigro and Neisser
(1983).

11 It might seem odd to recruit Martin’s ideas in order to defend a conceptualist
view, given that, as we have seen, he elsewhere advances substantial criticisms
of conceptualism. Nevertheless, there is no internal inconsistency in Martin’s
views – his conception of the role of imagery in episodic memory is logically
independent of his arguments about the role of concepts in perceptual experience
and memory.

12 The notion of intentionality or representation invoked here suggests one might
be able to have an episodic memory where what is represented in the memory
fails to refer to anything. This is misleading however, because memory is a facti-
ve attitude, meaning that one cannot succeed in remembering something that did
not happen. So in the case of an episodic memory, where a subject remembers
something she experienced in the past, the object of experience represented in
the memory must have a unique reference in order to secure the state she is in as
an actual case of memory.

13 It is worth pointing out that Campbell’s notion of “deep decentering” involves
the idea that in episodic memory a subject simulates the original experience ra-
ther than representing it. According to Campbell (2002: 191), this requires con-
ceiving the object of the experience as a constituent of the memory, rather than
the memory as bearing a representational relation to the object. Nevertheless, both Campbell and Martin envision the constitutive link between episodic memory and the recalled experience as involving some sort of relation between the memory and the experience that in no way depends on memory imagery matching experience. It might do justice to their views to say that they both posit an intentional relation between memory and the recalled object, where representing is one sort of intentional relation and simulating is another. Interestingly, both Campbell and Martin conceive their views as developing Russell’s (1912) notion of memory as acquaintance with past.

I am extremely grateful to John Campbell and Alva Noë for suggesting invaluable improvements to an earlier version of this essay.

References


Genone, J. Manuscript. ‘Memory and the Content of Experience’.


James Genone
University of California, Berkeley
jgenone@berkeley.edu